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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARY ANN MOON,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

Appeals Ct. No. 970542CA

STANLEY W. MOON,
Respondent/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

THE APPELLANT, submits the following reply brief to the brief of the appellee.
1. AS TO APPELLEE5 S STA TEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellee in her Statement of the Case under A. Nature of the Case sets forth that the
trial court had "made clarifications concerning the meaning of income for purposes of calculating
alimony" at p. 3 of her brief. Part of the argument as presented to this court in appellant's brief is
that the trial court has in fact made modifications to the Decree of Divorce rather than
clarifications. If in fact clarification are what are deemed as being made in this matter then the
Decree of Divorce is ambiguous in its meaning and the only way for the same to be resolved is

1

through modifying the document. This would therefore require the filing of a Petition for
Modification.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
At p. 4 under B. Course of Proceedings of appellee's Brief the appellee fails to inform the
court that the trial court had also entered an order in conformity with Commissioner Lisa A. Jones
Minute Entry. The order dismissing the Order to Show Cause is found at R-p.964-968.
2. AS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Under the Statement of Facts at p. 5 of appellee's brief, appellee sets forth that "the
respondent then agreed to pay thirty percent (30%) of any additional income over and above
$150,000" R at 497." This is a misstatement of the testimony and the Decree of Divorce. The
respondent had in fact agreed to pay thirty percent (30%) of any additional bonuses that he
received, not any additional income.
At p. 8 the appellee misstates the findings of the Commissioner. The appellee sets forth
that the Commissioner had found that the respondent had changed his bonuses to salaries. This is
incorrect. The Commissioner had found that the "defendant as a shareholder and officer of MST
Trucking voted, with others, to change the corporate structure of the company." ( R at 959.)
The Commissioner did not find that he had changed his bonuses to salaries.
Further at p. 8 under the Statement of Facts the appellee sets forth that the trial court
"revised the Commissioner's prior ruling dismissing the Order to Show Cause". There was no
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revision but rather a "rehearing" of a dismissed Order to Show Cause which occurred over the
objections of appellant's counsel.
3. AS TO APPELLEE'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Pursuant to the appellee's Summary of Arguments as found at p.9 of appellee's brief the
appellant does not dispute that Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the judge
to revise an order before the entry of judgement adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties. It is disputed that the Rule is pertinent in this action. In this case the
Order to Show Cause was dismissed prior to the filing of the appellee's Petition for Modification.
(See Order at R 967-968.)
In \ 2 of the appellee's Summary of Arguments it is for this court to determine whether or
not Judge Wilkinson "appropriately reinstated" the Order to Show Cause. As previously noted
this is one of the arguments of the appellant's brief.
The appellee sets forth in her Summary of Arguments in ^ 2 that the respondent diverted
income. There was absolutely no testimony or evidence presented that the respondent at any time
diverted any income in the form of "bonuses" back to salary or any other type of diversion. The
appellee further sets forth that there is an alternative theory based upon the claim of fraud in this
matter. There was absolutely no showing of any fraud nor none established nor the same properly
pled or proven. The trial court did not find fraud and there is no evidence of any fraud in the
record.
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In f 3 of the appellee's Summary of Arguments appellee cites the case of Morgan v.
Morgan. 854 P.2d 559 (Ut.App. 1993). Appellee states that this case stands for the proposition
that the court may consider K-1 income in dividing assets among parties in a divorce action. In
Morgan the only discussion of K-1 income is discussed at p. 566 where the K-1 was used to value
an asset to be distributed between the parties. There is no discussion in Morgan that K-1
distributions are income but only that that was the means by determining the value of an asset.
4. AS TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT
In appellee's Argument, Point I at pp. 10-11 it sets forth that the respondent had
converted his bonus to salary. There are no references or citations from the record or transcripts
by appellee for this proposition because there was no evidence presented or established that the
respondent had converted his bonuses to salary.
At p. 11 of the appellee's Brief the appellee sets forth that she waited for the Petition to be
in front of Judge Wilkinson before raising a Rule 54(b) motion to request that the matter be
before the court on the Order to Show Cause. This is simply untrue. There is no evidence that a
Rule 54(b) motion was ever made, requested or sought by the appellee. Appellee can not been
point to anything in the record for this type of motion ever being raised. The trial court, sua
sponte, decided that the matter would be heard on either the Order to Show Cause or the Petition
to Modify, as the court considered them to be "one and the same". As noted from the rulings and
the arguments as presented in the appellant's Brief the trial court believes that the only difference
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between an Order to Show Cause and a Petition for Modification is the retro-active effect. The
trial court has not recognized that there are different burdens of proof and different elements
between an Order to Show Cause and a Petition to Modify.
It is disputed between the parties as to whether or not there would be any applicability of
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule itself sets forth that it has to be made
before the "entry of afinaljudgement". The intent of the rule is to pertain solely to multiple
parties and multiple claims not for the single type of claim against individual parties as exist in this
case. As has been noted to this court in the Brief of the appellant there are different elements and
burdens of proof between and Order to Show Cause and a Petition for Modification. The denial
of relief under an Order to Show Cause can be appealed to an appellate court. The adjudication
of an Order to Show Cause is a final order. In this particular case there was a final adjudication of
the Order to Show Cause with its dismissal. If the appellee believes that she should have
prevailed on the Order to Show Cause the appellee was required to file a Notice of Appeal within
thirty (30) days after the entry of the Order by Judge Wilkinson. (See Rule 4 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure). This never occurred. To use Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is inappropriate and should not be allowed by this court. The intention of that rule is
not for the type of actions that were taken by the trial court in trying to adjudicate a matter that
had already been dismissed. A motion to reconsider is inappropriate and not allowable. Drury v.
Lunceford. 18 Ut.2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (Ut. 1996) See also Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841 (Ut. 1980)
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There was no notice of reconsideration and the first time this was raised as to having the
matter "re-adjudicated" under the Order to Show Cause was when Judge Wilkinson, sua sponte,
proceeds to say that he is going to adjudicate the matter under both theories of Order to Show
Cause and the Petition for Modification at the pre-trial which was approximately one-week prior
to the time of trial on May 23, 1996.
Point II at p. 19 of appellee's Brief appellee argues that the court should view this matter
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. There are no references or citations to in the record to
using this particular claim of equitable estoppel being presented at the trial court. This is because
equitable estoppel was not argued nor presented to the trial court and the first time for it being
brought is now before this court. This also applies to the appellee's claim of fraud commencing at
p. 21 of appellee's Brief. There was no proof or argument of fraud nor was there any findings of
fraud in this matter by the trial court. The appellee wrongfully argues fraud in her brief. There
was no evidence of the same nor presentation of the same to the trial court.
At p.25 of the appellee's Brief an argument for retro-activity appellee states that "retroactive relief is available if fraud or material misrepresentation or concealment of the financial
condition is shown to have existed at the time of the Decree of Divorce". Again this was not
argued at the trial court and there was no evidence of any fraud or material misrepresentation or
concealment of financial condition. This is the reason why no reference is made to any parts in
the records of these particular acts because none exist.

00005393.98

6

All of the above arguments of Rule 54(b), equitable estoppel, fraud and retro-activity are
being asked to be considered when they were not raised or presented at trial. This court has held
that matters not admitted in evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered on appeal to
the Court of Appeal. Ebbert v. Ebbert 744 P.2d 1019 (Ut.App. 1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d
1278. All the above arguments should not be allowed by this court.
In Point III of appellee's Brief at p.27 the appellee again cites the case of Morgan v.
Morgan. What Morgan stands for as it relates to K-1 income is not the same as is being argued in
this particular action. The Morgans had property for distribution purposes which used K-1 for the
valuation of an asset not for the determination of the payment of alimony as is being requested in
this action.
In Point IVat p.28 the appellee discusses the attorney's fees. This court in Morgan v.
Morgan set forth the following:
"The award, however, must be based upon evidence of the receiving spouses
financial need for attorneys fees. The ability of the other spouse to pay and the
reasonableness of the requested award...."
"Reasonable attorneys fees are not measured by what an attorney actually bills, nor
is the number of hours spent on the case determinative in computing these. In
determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees, '...[a] court may consider, among
other factors the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in
representing the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case,
the fee customarily charged in locality for similar services, the amounts involved in
the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved.'" IdL at 568, 569, quoting Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d at 1336.
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In this case there was no evidence presented of any of these factors in determining the attorneys
fees that were requested by appellee's counsel Appellee's counsel was only able to give a total
figure for what he billed and what Mr Fankhauser charged There was no showing that what he
did was appropriate or reasonable.
CONCLUSIONS
The appellee's arguments relating to Rule 54(b), equitable estoppel, fraud and retroactivity being first raised on appeal should be summarily dismissed by this court The relief as
requested by appellant in his Brief is appropriate and should be granted by this court
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Lf>

day of July, 1998

RANIf)Y S LUDLOW
Attorhey for Respondent/Appellant
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